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HORIZONTAL POLITICAL EXTERNALITIES:
THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
DISASTER MANAGEMENT
BEN DEPOORTER†
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses the dynamics of shared political
accountability and provides a supply- and demand-side analysis of
disaster management. Because multiple levels of government share
political accountability in national scale disasters, disaster
management is subject to a collective action problem. Introducing the
concept of horizontal political externalities, this Article explains the
shortcomings of disaster management in terms of asymmetric political
accountability costs for ex ante preparedness and ex post relief. In the
presence of shared accountability, investments in prevention and relief
by one government actor confer positive externalities upon other
government actors by reducing the overall chance of being held
responsible in ensuing disasters. In contrast, ex post disaster relief
involves negative externalities when action by one agency makes other
agencies or representatives look worse. Because positive externalities
are undersupplied and negative externalities are oversupplied,
political externalities distort disaster management policy. When
political accountability is shared, no single actor bears the full brunt
of accountability. In addition, uncertainty and finger-pointing reduce
the total sum of political accountability. The different effects of ex
ante and ex post disaster management on political accountability may
shed light on events before and after Hurricane Katrina. I provide
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suggestions for further avenues of empirical and theoretical research
on this new positive political theory of horizontal political
externalities and political accountability losses.

INTRODUCTION
Hurricane Katrina left parts of a famous American city
uninhabitable and demoralized much of the Gulf Coast region. The
Katrina disaster differs in many respects from the hurricanes that
regularly visit the American Southeast. Ever since French colonist
Jean Baptiste le Moyne de Bienville built his settlement on hurricaneprone swampland in the middle of three huge water pools—the
Mississippi Delta, the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Pontchartrain—
experts have viewed these geographical features as a disaster waiting
to happen.1 Although destruction was unavoidable with a storm of
Katrina’s size,2 the repeated warnings and anticipation of the storm
accentuate the striking lack of emergency preparedness and raise
3
doubts regarding the nation’s investments in critical infrastructure.
1. See, e.g., Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, a Chaotic Response:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 11
(2005) (statement of Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director, Federal Emergency Management
Agency) (regarding Hurricane Katrina as “the worst-case scenario that everyone had always
talked about regarding the City of New Orleans”); Mark Fischetti, The Drowning of New
Orleans, SCI. AM., Oct. 2001, at 76, 78 (explaining that only a massive reengineering effort can
save New Orleans from a catastrophic flood); John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Evolving
Danger—Experts know we face a greater threat from hurricanes than previously expected. But
because the land is shrinking and the coastline is disappearing, scientists can’t say just how
vulnerable we are, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 23, 2002, at J12.
2. “[N]o matter how much is spent and how much planning takes place, natural
catastrophes will continue and will sometimes be unexpected.” Gary S. Becker, . . . And the
Economics of Disaster Management, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2005, at A12. “While it may seem
contradictory to ‘plan’ for an emergency—emergencies are by definition unplanned events—in
fact there is considerable value in such planning.” Ken Lerner, Governmental Negligence
Liability Exposure in Disaster Management, 23 URB. LAW. 333, 334 (1991).
3. See Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency:
Hearing Before the H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response
to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (opening statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman)
(“Dr. Kathleen Tierney, director of the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado,
Boulder, said on a recent radio program that government missteps along the Gulf Coast were
‘absolutely avoidable.’ It was ‘common knowledge,’ she said, that the levees could not withstand
more than a category 3 storm, that thousands of residents without cars would be stuck if an
evacuation order was given, and that hesitancy in issuing mandatory evacuations would prove
devastating.”); William L. Waugh, Jr., The Disaster That Was Katrina, NAT. HAZARDS
OBSERVER, Nov. 2005, at 7, 7 (“When Hurricane Katrina came ashore on August 29, she ended
decades of anticipation. There were few hazards in the United States more studied by scientists
and engineers and there was ample warning that a strong storm could cause the city of New
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Hurricane Katrina exposed major weaknesses in government
emergency management, including disaster mitigation and response
and relief procedures. Inadequate planning led to critical problems
regarding food delivery, medical supplies, personnel, communication
networks, and evacuation assistance. The events surrounding
Hurricane Katrina are sad evidence of the lack of government
investment in ex ante action, i.e., disaster preparation. This stands in
contrast to the expenditure on ex post disaster relief. The government
currently spends billions of dollars on relief and reconstruction,4 but it
consistently shorted precautionary investments that would have
5
reduced today’s losses at a small percentage of the costs. This Article
focuses on the underlying causes of such deficiencies in national
disaster planning.
In this Article I model disaster preparation and relief policies in
a public choice framework in which politicians are “sellers” of
disaster management policies who compete for votes from voters who
6
are “consumers” of such policies. My analysis of the supply and
demand of disaster management predicts that disaster preparation
7
will be undersupplied and ex post relief will be oversupplied.

Orleans to flood”); Josh White & Peter Whoriskey, Planning, Response Are Faulted, WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 2005, at A1 (“Jack Harrald, director of the Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk
Management at George Washington University, said researchers and academics have for years
been studying New Orleans because of its particular vulnerabilities to disaster.”).
4. “FEMA . . . made mission assignments totaling approximately $7.4 billion,” including
support for the Corps of Engineers ($3.5 billion) and other elements of the Department of
Defense ($2.2 billion), private contracts ($1.6 billion), and public assistance to states ($1.0
billion). PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, HOMELAND SECURITY
ROUNDTABLE, COMPENDIUM OF HURRICANE OVERSIGHT IN THE GULF STATES 3 (2005).
5. In addition to suboptimal investment in levees, natural barriers, and zoning regulation,
some of the harm is due to decreased funding of emergency management. See Recovering after
Katrina: Ensuring That FEMA Is up to the Task: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic
Development, Public Buildings & Emergency Management of the H. Comm. on Transportation
and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Janice R. Kilgore, CEM, Director,
Department of Public Safety, Escambia County, Fla.) (“State and Federal governments should
increase funding specific to emergency management activities. In the fiscal year that just ended
(04/05) Escambia County’s share of FEMA’s emergency management funding was only $47,222.
This was $43.00 less than the prior year (03/04) and $82.00 less than the year before that (02/03).
Funding levels should be increasing not decreasing if we are going to build an adequate
emergency management response in this Country.”).
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 165–66 (2003)
(defining the reality of American democracy as a type of market for votes and services). I
assume that, even when designing disaster management, political actors will take into account
the electoral impact of their actions, alongside public interest considerations.
7. I evaluate disaster management from a cost-benefit perspective. The model of shared
accountability could also be extended to examine the distorting effects of horizontal political
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There is an overlap in political accountability among the
different levels of government with regard to national disaster
8
management. Consequently, the decision of one political actor
affects the political standing of other actors. In particular, when
accountability is shared among different government actors,
investments in disaster preparation confer benefits upon other
government actors. That is, an investment in disaster preparation by
one actor decreases the chance that others will be held responsible
after a disaster. I call this a positive horizontal political externality. In
contrast, ex post relief efforts impose costs on other government
actors. When one political actor provides ex post relief, political
actors that do not provide relief look relatively worse. I call this a
negative horizontal political externality.
Because political actors lack the incentive to confer benefits on
other actors, they will undersupply disaster preparation policies. This
may explain the lack of investment prior to Katrina into Louisiana’s
levee systems, zoning regulation, and emergency planning. But
because the costs of ex post relief are imposed on other political
9
actors, one may see an oversupply of ex post relief. In fact, this is
what occurred after Katrina.
Furthermore, this Article argues that shared responsibilities
create political accountability deadweight losses. That is, shared
responsibility and finger-pointing among political actors confuses the
public, thereby reducing the total amount of political accountability.
Part I examines the dynamics of shared political accountability
and provides a supply-side analysis of disaster management. It also
applies the concept of horizontal and vertical political externalities to
disaster management and strategic decisionmaking among
government actors. Part II analyzes demand-side factors in disaster
management. This part introduces the concept of political deadweight
losses and discusses the effect of voters’ cognitive bias on the demand
for disaster management policies. I conclude with suggestions for
further avenues of empirical and theoretical research.
externalities using other hypothetical benchmarks for disaster management, such as
precautionary principles and fairness or humanitarian considerations.
8. Political accountability refers to the degree to which a political body is held
responsible, as reflected by the impact on its election prospects or approval ratings.
9. It might seem odd to speak in terms of an oversupply of relief for disasters. Excessive
relief, however, might consist of duplicative expenditures or expenditures in which the benefits
do not justify the costs. Also, on a comparative level, ex post expenditures may be considered
excessive whenever they could be avoided with less costly ex ante investments.
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I. THE SUPPLY SIDE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
Because various government actors share responsibilities in
national scale disasters, there are interaction effects among
government actors in national disaster management. The interaction
between the different levels of government influences the supply of
emergency preparation and ex post relief. In this Part, I examine
these interaction effects and their impact on the supply of disaster
management.
A. Shared Political Accountability
The public sees the political responsibility for national disaster
management as shared among the different levels of government.
This causes the decisions of one political actor to affect the political
standing of others. In particular, the public holds one level of
government accountable for the actions of another. In this context,
accountability refers to the degree to which a political actor will be
held responsible, as reflected in election results10 or approval ratings.11
Shared political accountability is a result of both institutional and
subjective factors. With respect to the institutional factors, the large
scale of national disasters involves a high degree of overlap in the
allocation of disaster management tasks across the levels of
government. For example, state and local levels handle ex post relief
12
activities, and the federal government offers assistance and provides
incentives to local and state government officials to engage in optimal
13
mitigation. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

10. In the literature of political economy, political accountability is generally associated
with elections. See generally V.O. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE (1966) (arguing
that by basing their votes on evaluations of performance, voters provide incentives to
incumbents to pay attention to their preferences).
11. Political accountability may also be measured more continuously by examining
approval ratings. I am grateful to Matthew Adler for suggesting approval ratings as a yardstick
to measure accountability.
12. An increasing number of federal programs of disaster preparedness have been adopted.
This expanding area of regulation includes the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C.), and the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-390, 114
Stat. 1552 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Other federal programs include the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2000), the Earthquake Loss Reduction Act of 2001, H.R. 2762, 107th Cong. (1st Sess.
2001), and the Earthquake Loss Reduction Act of 2001, S.424, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
13. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 5172(b)(2) (2000) provides that “the President shall
promulgate regulations to reduce the Federal share of assistance” if facilities have “been
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14
in
manages disaster preparation and response programs
15
coordination with state and local governments. Although evacuation
policies are set principally in state law and local ordinances, many
16
aspects of civilian evacuation reside at the federal level. When the
scale of a disaster overwhelms state and local authorities, federal
officials are required to assist evacuation procedures,17 and must take
the lead “on coordinating necessary decisions, support research and
rescue efforts, and . . . provide public health, medical, and mental
health support at casualty evacuation points and refugee shelters.”18
Law enforcement in disaster management involves shared duties
among the FBI, the U.S. Marshall Service (USMS), the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
19
Firearms and Explosives. During Hurricane Katrina these agencies

damaged, on more than one occasion within the preceding 10-year period, by the same type of
event; and . . . the owner . . . has failed to implement appropriate mitigation measures to address
the hazard that caused the damage to the facility.”). Such division of incentives adds to the
complex web of fragmented political responsibilities with regard to disaster management
14. Exec. Order No. 12,148, 3 C.F.R. 412 (1979).
15. In 1995, for example, FEMA introduced a National Mitigation Strategy, which
attempted to reduce exposure to disasters in a partnership between all levels of government and
the private sector. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, MULTI-HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION RISK ASSESSMENT xxii (1997). Other projects, such as the Impact Program,
measured communities’ level of disaster resistance. See Disaster Research Ctr., Disaster
Resistant Communities Initiative: Process Evaluation of FEMA’s Project Impact,
http://www.udel.edu/DRC/drci.html (lasted visited Sept. 3, 2006) (“In 1997, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency began the pilot stage of Project Impact, a program designed to
encourage local communities to step up their efforts to contain future disaster losses. The goals
of the program are to mobilize resources, stimulate the development of partnerships, spur
mitigation activities, and enable communities to cope more effectively when disasters occur, so
as to reduce long-term losses.”).
16. See generally KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DISASTER EVACUATION AND
DISPLACEMENT POLICY: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RS22235.pdf (elaborating the powers and roles of local governments in evacuations). For
instance, federal statutes authorize agency heads to apply federal resources to assist disaster
evacuations. Section 403 of the Disaster Relief and Emergency Amendments of 1988 provide
that the president may direct the secretary of defense to apply resources to perform “emergency
work which is made necessary by such incident and which is essential for the preservation of life
and property.” 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1) (2000). “[F]ederal policy defers to the states to enact
laws pertinent to evacuation [measures], and local officials . . . work with state officials to
enforce [these] laws.” BEA, supra, at 2.
17. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 8 (2004). The
National Response Plan (NPR) vests the responsibility for the displacement, the provision of
shelter, and the provision of resources to areas of displacement in both FEMA and the
American Red Cross. Id. at 11.
18. Id. at 2–3.
19. On September 2, 2005, the attorney general called upon “[t]he FBI . . . to deploy special
agents . . . and tactical [and communication] assets . . . ; [t]he DEA . . . to deploy Mobile
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performed alongside state and local authorities, such as local police
20
officials. This brief description of the shared duties of federal, state
and local governments illustrates how no single layer of government
21
has unilateral control over the response to disasters. In this setting of
entangled responsibilities, politicians may realize that their actions
will impact each other’s accountability in the market for votes.
Second, accountability also depends on the public’s perception of
shared responsibility. As illustrated above, disaster management
involves a high degree of overlapping duties across different levels of
government. This increases the public’s perception that political
responsibility for disaster management cuts across all levels of
government. But the public’s perception may also be unrelated to this
formal assignment of duties. For example, even though certain relief
activities may reside exclusively with the local government,
shortcomings in relief efforts during a natural disaster may negatively
affect the approval ratings of other levels of government if the public
believes that the president, the federal government, or the governor
are always responsible during national disasters or, alternatively, if
the public holds a mistaken belief that different levels of government
share responsibilities in such relief efforts.
Shared political accountability creates a common pool problem.
The supply of emergency preparedness in these areas requires
coordination among the various levels of government. The different
levels of government must successfully coordinate their efforts;
Enforcement Teams, special agents, and . . . helicopters and aircraft . . . ; [t]he ATF to establish
a Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT) . . . ; and [t]he USMS . . . to deploy Deputy U.S. Marshals
to conduct prisoner transport operations and . . . additional court security” services. Hurricane
Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Government Affairs, 109th Cong. 2–3 (2006) (statement of
Kenneth W. Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Office, FBI), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/020606Kaiser.pdf. Although limited to special circumstances, even
the FBI assumes certain duties pertaining to the unique law enforcement needs that might arise
as a result of natural disasters.
20. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), a federal program with mutual aid
features that provides local agencies with federal resources, emphasizes mutual cooperation as
an essential component of law enforcement in emergencies. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MUTUAL AID: MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR MEETING
REGIONAL THREATS, at xiii (2005).
21. See Richard A. Falkenrath, Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst., Panel Discussion at the
Brookings Institution: Hurricane Katrina: Where Do We Go From Here? (Sept. 8, 2005)
(transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20050908.pdf) (“[O]ur response
as a nation is highly interdependent . . . . [I]f one layer of government or one agency within one
layer of government gets [things] catastrophically wrong, the entire response will be
handicapped as a result of that.”).
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otherwise, there may be too much or too little supply of disaster
22
management policies. For example, when a public policy is
politically attractive—that is, it is expected to generate additional
votes in an upcoming election or lead to higher approval ratings for
an incumbent politician—a single government decisionmaker will
adopt the program. In contrast, when two government actors compete
for the supply of politically attractive programs, “it is in the interest of
both suppliers to seek to gain the votes in implementing the program
first.”23 Because political suppliers are at risk of losing votes to each
other, they each attempt to obtain the political gain first. Even when
one assumes that politicians are principally concerned with
maximizing social welfare,24 the competitive nature of the electoral
process might undermine the optimal provision of public goods and
services. That is, if political suppliers consider merely the electoral
costs and benefits of their policy decisions, each level of government
will try to outbid the other in an attempt to “pre-empt the political
field”25 and attain the highest amount of approval. Because politicians
do not consider the impact of their policies on other levels of
government, they will not take account of the direct and indirect
external effects created by their decisions. This is the basic premise of
political externalities on the decisionmaking of political actors.
B. Horizontal and Vertical Political Externalities
The term “political externalities” has been used on a few
occasions in the literature to describe situations in which the political
process allows some individuals to obtain the benefit of an activity
without being “forced to bear the full cost of the activity.”26 In public
choice theory, it has been used mostly to refer to “the ability of some
groups to use the power of government to transfer benefits to

22. Common pool dilemmas engender social waste when actors do not fully internalize the
cost of their activities. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243–48
(1968). This may result in a race to capture. For example, government actors might spend
money whenever they think they can reap political benefits. If each government actor decides in
this manner, duplicate expenditures may result.
23. Jean-Luc Migué, Public Choice in a Federal System, 90 PUB. CHOICE 235, 239 (1997).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 241.
26. Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups,
53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 318 (2002).
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themselves without being forced to pay compensation to the losers.”
In the context of federalism it refers to situations “in which state
legislatures are able to provide benefits to local interests by imposing
costs on politically disorganized individuals who do not reside within
the state.”28 More often, it has been used simply to refer to political
decisions that impose external costs on other jurisdictions.29 In this
situation, “political” externalities amount to negative or positive
externalities imposed by citizens upon each other through the
political process.
I propose here to extend the application of the term political
externalities to externalities that apply not merely vertically, in which
some constituents obtain benefits at the expense of other
constituents, but also horizontally, i.e., among different political
actors and levels of government. Horizontal political externalities
arise whenever political decisions impact the electoral outcome or
approval ratings of other political actors or levels of government that
were not involved in the decisionmaking. In this sense horizontal
externalities are truly “political” externalities: the third-party costs
relate to political effects as measured by election prospects or
approval ratings.
One can further distinguish between positive and negative
horizontal political externalities. Political action may have a positive
effect on the electoral chances or approval ratings of other levels of
government. For example, when there is an overlap in duties

27. Id. at 320; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 89 (1962) (“The
member of the dissident minority suffers external effects of collective decisions enforced on
him . . . .”); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and Political Response:
Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139, 141–42 (1975) (stating that firms seek
economic regulation in order to obtain above-market rate returns); Todd J. Zywicki,
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental
Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 856–74 (1999) (arguing that many environmental
regulations can be explained by the rent-seeking behavior of environmental interest groups that
use the coercive power of government to pursue utility and wealth at the expense of other
individuals to subsidize these preferences).
28. Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 467, 471 (explaining the disposition of state legislators towards state antitakeover
laws).
29. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2054 (1993) (“[N]ations will often fail to adopt
appropriate environmental standards because of a political externality; the costs of more
stringent standards will be borne by the nation adopting them, whereas a significant portion of
the benefits will go to those in other countries.”).
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regarding public health issues such as obesity, a federal program that
successfully tackles this issue may have a positive effect on the
standing of other levels of government that have shared
responsibilities in this area. If there is an overlap of responsibilities, a
successful federal program that reduces obesity will decrease the
political liability on this issue for local and state government actors.
Because other levels of government are able to free ride on obesity
management, this may free up budgetary means for politically
rewarding expenditures on other issues. Also, as an indirect effect of
the federal program, public attention might be drawn away from
other (related) public health issues. In other cases, policies
implemented by one level of government may have a negative effect
on the political standing of other levels of government. For example,
political actors who share responsibility may appear inactive by
comparison.
Thus, public perceptions of responsibility may create
interdependency between different governmental actors with respect
to approval ratings and electoral payoffs. Such interdependency may
lead to strategic decisionmaking among the various levels of
government. As I contend next, horizontal political externalities may
provide some explanation for the contrast between political inertia
regarding preparation before a disaster, on the one hand, and the
abundance of relief after a disaster, on the other hand.30
C. The Supply Effect of Horizontal Externalities on Disaster
Management
Each level of government has two general options with regard to
disaster management: (1) preparation and mitigation policies
implemented prior to a disaster, and (2) relief policies implemented
after a disaster. Politicians concerned with approval ratings and
reelection prospects will consider the political implications of these
general options. This may affect policies in disaster management in a
number of ways.
The political rewards from ex ante and ex post disaster
management policies are very different. First, the electoral impact of
expenditures in ex post disaster management is higher than the
electoral benefit of investing in ex ante disaster preparation.

30. Note that such disaster relief will be relatively ineffective when prior investments in
preparedness have not been made.
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Investments in ex ante preparation reduce the risk and magnitude of
damage from disasters. But the results are relatively more uncertain
and less tangible than expenditures in ex post relief. Sending in
troops, personnel, and food and medical supplies is highly visible and
susceptible to media coverage. In contrast, successful efforts at
preventing harm and increasing preparedness do not attract a great
deal of media attention. For example, a local municipality’s stringent
enforcement of building codes will receive less attention than the ex
post rescue efforts after a building collapse, even though preventing
31
code violations may save more lives. Second, political actors
immediately capture the political rewards from ex post relief, whereas
political rewards from ex ante preparation may only materialize
outside the electoral time horizon of a politician. Because politicians
are concerned with getting reelected, they have limited time horizons,
leading them to “prefer policies that yield tangible benefits for
constituents in the near term.”32
Also, ex post relief is more likely to confer negative externalities
on other levels of government. This will likely induce high levels of ex
post relief efforts by the federal government and state governments.
For example, Texas sent troops and medical personnel to the Gulf
Coast region after Katrina made landfall, and this affected the costs
and benefits of participating in the relief effort for other states like
Florida. Representatives in Texas and Florida were probably aware of
voters’ sensitivity about natural disasters and the government
response to such events, because both regions are disaster-prone.
When Texas sent troops and supplies, this probably put pressure on
Florida to do the same to avoid appearing disinterested to voters.
Consequently, Florida immediately sent in teams of doctors and
nurses as well as $40 million in relief aid.33 San Antonio offered
34
temporary housing to twenty-five thousand evacuees, and Texas
governor Rick Perry quickly responded by coordinating relief efforts
with other states and promised schooling for displaced children.35

31. Such a policy will be more efficient, for example, if it reduces an equal number of
potential victims at a lower cost.
32. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE 137 (2004).
33. Special Report: When Government Fails—Katrina’s Aftermath, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10,
2005, at 25, 27.
34. Id.
35. Louisiana Seeks Schools for Displaced Students, CNN.COM, Sept. 1, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/EDUCATION/09/01/katrina.schools/index.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2006).
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Arkansas welcomed seventy thousand refugees by opening National
Guard armories and churches. Wisconsin and Minnesota offered
housing to thousand of refugees.
The federal government also participated in the race to provide
relief. More than sixteen thousand federal personnel were deployed
to help state and local officials along the Gulf Coast recover from the
damage.36 The National Guard deployed over forty-five thousand
troops to Louisiana and Mississippi two weeks after Katrina’s
37
landfall. Federal support to state and local officials and volunteer
organizations enabled relief activities and assisted with law
enforcement operations in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. As of
February 2006, $88 billion in federal aid had been allocated for relief,
recovery, and rebuilding, with another $20 billion requested to help
victims of the storm and to rebuild the region.38 But the federal
government and state governments consistently shorted
precautionary investments that would have reduced losses at a small
percentage of the costs.
Because ex post disaster relief has the potential for high political
reward, one would expect politicians to be interested in increasing its
effectiveness through advance planning. Such investments could
improve many aspects of ex post disaster relief such as evacuation
measures, the delivery of supplies, and the continued operation of
communication networks. Also, relief efforts may be perceived as
more effective, thereby leading to greater political reward. So why do
governments fail to plan in advance? First, the political benefits of ex
ante preparation policies are not immediate and may accrue beyond
the time horizons of many politicians.
Second, there is an indivisibility and common pool problem.
Because major disaster management planning necessarily involves
various levels of government, the political benefits of such planning
are automatically shared with other levels of government, that is,
investing in planning confers positive externalities on other levels of

36. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: A Commitment to Continued Recovery and
Rebuilding in the Gulf Coast (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/12/20051221-10.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).
37. Mark Sappenfield, Katrina Poses Key Test for Stretched National Guard, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 2, 2005, at 2.
38. OFFICE OF THE FED. COORDINATOR FOR GULF COAST REBUILDING, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., PROGRESS MADE: A 6-MONTH UPDATE ON HURRICANE RELIEF,
RECOVERY AND REBUILDING 1 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
GulfCoast_Katrina6-monthFactSheet2-2806.pdf.
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government. These positive externalities reduce the potential political
liability that other political actors face. Accordingly, political actors
will free ride on the efforts of their peers who do engage in
preparation and planning. The result is an undersupply of disaster
preparation and mitigation policies.
Shared political accountability in the disaster management
context brings to mind a well-known proposition in social psychology
regarding the debilitating effect of diffused responsibility in collective
action settings. When members of a group perceive that their
obligation to act is shared with other members of the group,
39
individual responsibility is diluted. Shared responsibilities lead to
lower individual responsibilities, which lower the total sum of
responsibility. Similar phenomena may explain the undersupply of
disaster preparation and mitigation policies. Even discounting
hindsight bias, it is now well documented that virtually all levels of
government have underinvested in precautions for a major hurricane
in the Gulf Coast region. Despite repeated warnings40 and
41
recommendations, there was a lack of investment in levee
construction, weak enforcement of building codes, inadequate
evacuation planning, insufficient shelter, a shortage of supplies, poor

39. See generally Bernard Guerin, Social Behaviors as Determined by Different
Arrangements of Social Consequences: Diffusion of Responsibility Effect with Competition, 143
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 313 (2003); Bibb Latané & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander
Intervention in Emergencies, 10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215 (1968); Daniel M.
Wegner & Donna Schaefer, The Concentration of Responsibility: An Objective Self-Awareness
Analysis of Group Size Effects in Helping Situations, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 147
(1978).
40. Experts had warned about the catastrophic likelihood of the passage of a major
hurricane through Louisiana. The risk of a major hurricane striking and flooding New Orleans
had been covered in issues of Scientific American and National Geographic in 2001 and 2004
respectively, and featured prominently in a specialized literature on disaster emergency
planning. See Shirley Laska, What if Hurricane Ivan Had Not Missed New Orleans?, 29 NAT.
HAZARDS OBSERVER 5, 5–6 (2004).
41. After Hurricane Andrew in 1992, a Grand Jury Report of Dade County conducted an
in-depth analysis of many of the disaster management failures that surfaced again after that
storm. See generally Stephen T. Maher, Emergency Decisionmaking During the State of Florida’s
Response to Hurricane Andrew, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1009 (1993). Similarly, Florida’s Disaster
Planning and Response Review Committee recommended constructing better shelters in
threatened areas and improving the accessibility of communication networks before and after
disasters to better plan increased-capacity evacuation routes for handling mass exodus traffic
out of city areas. SPEAKER’S TASK FORCE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, FLA. HOUSE OF
REPS., FINAL REPORT 6 (1990).
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cooperation and communication between different levels of
42
government, and the list goes on.
Shared accountability leads politicians to impose external costs
on one another. Furthermore, it leads to inferior policymaking, which
imposes costs on citizens: “Governments’ actions . . . impact . . . most
43
citizens by the very fact of being taken.” For this reason,
government decisions “take on characteristics of public, non-divisible
goods.”44 Thus, there are two aspects to horizontal political
externalities: political actors impose costs on other political actors,
and in so doing political actors impose costs on citizens through
inferior policymaking.45
D. Political Markets and Political Transaction Costs
If shared political accountability and political externalities
misalign policymaking and voter preferences, what can voters do to
avoid the costs imposed by the undersupply of disaster preparation?
Voters have two options. In terms of the famous model of Albert
46
Hirschman, they can either exit or use their voice, that is, leave
political districts that have poor disaster preparation (exit), or not
vote for the politician that failed to adopt sound disaster management
policies (voice).47
Voters can withdraw support from local governments by
relocating out of political jurisdictions that fail to satisfy voter
48
preferences. The availability of the escape option is limited by the
42. Many, if not all, of the these observations can be found in H.R. REP. NO. 109-377 and
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED, infra note 57, at 51–
64.
43. Migué, supra note 23, at 248.
44. Id.
45. This is where horizontal and vertical political externalities connect. Because of their
effect on policy, horizontal political externalities impose external costs on citizens.
46. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
47. Id. at 4. Of course this option is limited when incumbents are in their last term of office.
But see Gary Becker & George Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–11 (1974) (providing suggestions to solve the last-period
problem for incumbents who are not running for office again, such as the threat of losing
pension in case of misbehavior in their last term).
48. See, e.g., Dennis C. Mueller, Buchanan, James McGill, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 181, 183 (Peter Newman ed., 1988) (“Tiebout’s
famous demonstration . . . that free mobility of individuals across local communities can
produce a Pareto-optimal allocation of local public goods is a classic argument for a
decentralized, federalist government . . . .”).
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fact that transaction costs are larger in political than in private
49
markets. “[T]he mobility exit is far from costless,” and in any case is
unavailable when political externalities are widespread. Voters also
have the periodic opportunity to make themselves heard in the voting
booth. Horizontal political externalities open the door to opposing
politicians, outsiders, and antipolitical sentiments. Thus, one would
expect politicians to improve their policymaking by taking
externalities into account. But will politicians remove political
externalities? Not necessarily.
Horizontal externalities are caused by uncoordinated, selfinterested behavior of political suppliers who compete in a market for
votes. To overcome horizontal externalities, therefore, some
cooperation among politicians is necessary. The issue is whether
politicians can overcome collective inaction through voluntary
bargaining. The answer to this question depends on the transaction
costs of political markets.
Obviously, political transaction costs increase with the number of
political bodies that share political duties. Political transaction costs
will also be higher when party affiliations vary more across different
levels of government. For example, a Democratic governor may face
pressure from his party to refrain from bipartisan policies that would
confer benefits on a Republican mayor or a Republican White House.
This pressure may be particularly acute when elections are near and
party loyalty requires partisan support for challengers on these levels
of government. In some sense, calls for bipartisan efforts in disaster
management are aimed at reducing the strategic considerations that
are part of the political transaction costs that enable horizontal
political externalities.
More fundamentally, transaction costs and the likely success of
coordination between political actors will be different for positive and
negative political externalities. With regard to positive externalities,
political actors need to overcome the individual incentive to sit back
and free ride on the efforts of other levels of government. Due to the
balance of power and the lack of hierarchy between different levels of
government, such coordination will not be easy. Removing negative
externalities may be even more difficult. First, negative horizontal
political externalities are a zero-sum game to political competitors.
One politician’s gain in electoral support or approval ratings is

49.

Id.
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another politician’s loss. This may diminish the potential bargaining
range.
Second, the pressure on politicians to remove negative
externalities might be lower than with positive externalities. This is
because the result of negative externalities is excessive disaster relief,
and the tragedy that follows a disaster will quiet most criticisms about
these excessive relief efforts. Even though such efforts might be
considered wasteful, they are insulated by the appearance of good
intentions and humanitarian concerns. In contrast, the result of
positive externalities is underinvestment in disaster preparation.
There is more pressure to remove these externalities because
underinvestment is often associated with neglect or disinterest.
Regardless, because negative horizontal externalities are politically
less costly, it is unlikely that politicians will overcome the collective
action problem independently.
II. THE DEMAND SIDE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
To this point, I have focused exclusively on supply-side factors to
explain failures in disaster management. Here, I discuss the effect of
demand-side factors. Political actors seeking reelection are driven by
voter preferences or the actors’ perceptions of those preferences. This
Part first argues that political markets fail to fully discipline
politicians because shared accountability reduces the overall sum of
accountability. Then it discusses the effect of voters’ cognitive bias on
the demand for disaster management policies.
A. Political Accountability Deadweight Losses
Part I considered the effect that shared political responsibility
has on the supply of disaster management policies. In that discussion,
I assumed that the voters’ demand for such policies is strong and
constant. But shared accountability may affect not only the supply of
disaster management policies, it may also affect the demand for
disaster management by reducing the degree to which politicians are
held responsible.
As stated earlier,50 political accountability is highly subjective. It
is difficult for the public to observe and assign specific responsibilities
for government failings. This provides an opportunity for strategic

50.

See supra Part I.A.
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action among political actors. Take, for instance, the blame game that
ensued once the failure of the relief effort and the lack of preparation
became apparent. The confusion and uncertainty created by the many
accusations made in the media by various political actors may
ultimately reduce the total sum of political accountability. Hence, the
blame game might be a profitable strategy for individual politicians
and politicians as a group.
Although they repeatedly expressed their distaste for finger51
pointing in public statements, federal, state, and local actors shifted
blame to each other as the shortcomings of the relief efforts became
apparent. According to some media sources, the White House waged
an organized campaign to direct focus on state and local
responsibilities.52 The Director of Homeland Security directed
attention to state and local failures, speaking in terms of a “cascading
53
series of breakdowns.” Most famous perhaps is Karl Rove’s
statement that “[t]he only mistake we made with Katrina was not
overriding the local government . . . .”54 Representative Tom DeLay,
then Republican House majority leader, characterized the Katrina

51. President Bush repeatedly told reporters that he had no interest in “play[ing] the blame
game.” See Fred Goldstein, Drowning New Orleans, WORKERS WORLD, Sept. 15, 2005,
http://www.workers.org/2005/us/putrid-waters-0915 (“President George W. Bush, flanked by his
cabinet, deflected media questions about the slowness of the federal government’s response to
the hurricane disaster by declaring that he did not want to ‘play the blame game.’”).
52. See Adam Nagourney & Anne E. Kornblut, White House Enacts a Plan to Ease
Political Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A14 (“Under the command of President Bush’s
two senior political advisers, the White House rolled out a plan this weekend to contain the
political damage from the administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina . . . . It began late last
week after Congressional Republicans called White House officials to register alarm about what
they saw as a feeble response by Mr. Bush to the hurricane . . . . The administration is also
working to shift the blame away from the White House and toward officials of New Orleans and
Louisiana who, as it happens, are Democrats.”); Jim VandeHei, Officials Deal With Political
Fallout by Pointing Fingers, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A17 (“In public statements and even
more bluntly behind the scenes, Bush administration officials have questioned local efforts to
rescue thousands of people who were stranded for days without food, water and shelter,
resulting in [the] death of an unknown number of Americans.”).
53. Scott Shane, After Failures, Government Officials Play Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
5, 2005, at A1; see also Statement by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff on Meet
the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 4, 2005) (transcript on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (“My understanding is, and again this is something that’s going to go back—we’re
going to go back over after the fact is, the plan that the New Orleans officials and the state
officials put together called for the Superdome to be the refuge of last resort.”).
54. Rove Off the Record on Katrina, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 17, 2005,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2005/09/17/rove-off-the-record-on-ka_n_7513.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2006).
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55
response as a state and local problem. A House report blamed local
police departments for lack of effectiveness and faulted the governor
of Louisiana and the New Orleans mayor for delaying the order for
56
mandatory evacuation A White House report blamed Gulf Coast
officials for not adequately anticipating massive evacuations.57 State
officials also turned against the local government, holding New
Orleans accountable for implementing an inadequate local
emergency plan and for overestimating its level of preparedness.58
Local officials returned the favor, impressing upon the media the
59
failures of the federal government to set the right priorities and its
delayed response to cries for help.60 Similarly, state officials blamed
the federal government for not funding fortifications to the New
Orleans levees and for failing to send troops, supplies, and other
assistance quickly enough.61 Local62 and state63 officials blamed FEMA

55. See Newsnight with Aaron Brown (CNN television broadcast Sept. 6, 2005) (transcript
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/06/asb.02.html (last visited Sept.
20, 2006)) (“[I]t’s the local officials trying to handle the problem. When they can’t handle the
problem, they go to the state. And the state does what they can do. And if they need assistance
from FEMA and the federal government, they ask for it. And it’s delivered.”).
56. H.R. REP. NO 109-377, at 108 (2006). For a summary of the extensive House Report,
see generally Julia Malone, Katrina Verdict: Plenty of Blame, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 24,
2006, at A3.
57. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 37 (2006),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
58. Susan B. Glasser & Josh White, Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top, WASH. POST, Sept.
4, 2005, at A1 (“Other federal and state officials pointed to Louisiana’s failure to measure up to
national disaster response standards, noting that the federal plan advises state and local
emergency managers not to expect federal aid for 72 to 96 hours, and base their own
preparedness efforts on the need to be self-sufficient for at least that period. ‘Fundamentally the
first breakdown occurred at the local level,’ said one state official who works with FEMA. ‘Did
the city have the situational awareness of what was going on within its borders? The answer was
no.’”).
59. See Waugh, supra note 3.
60. Mira Oberman & Patrick Moser, Troops, Aid Finally Reach New Orleans, IAFRICA,
Sept. 3, 2005, http://iafrica.com/news/worldnews/479881.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (“‘It’s
too doggone late!’ Nagin said in an angry and emotional interview aired on CNN.”).
61. See VandeHei, supra note 52 (“Louisiana officials pushed back hard against the White
House yesterday, sharply criticizing President Bush for offering a tentative and insufficient
response to the obliteration of New Orleans and then trying to shift the blame to the state and
local governments.”).
62. For instance, Jefferson Parish Emergency Management Director Maestri told the
Washington Post that city officials had forwarded a list of needs after the storm, but the federal
government was largely unresponsive. See Susan B. Glasser & Michael Grunwald, The Steady
Buildup to a City’s Chaos, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2005, at A1 (“[W]e sat here for five days
waiting. Nothing!”); see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Democrats and Others Criticize White House’s
Response to Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A1 (“‘This is a national disgrace. FEMA has
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for the slow response in the days following Hurricane Katrina.
Similarly, several Democrats accused FEMA of not responding
adequately to the emergency conditions in the Gulf Coast.65
In the weeks after Hurricane Katrina a CNN/USA Today/Gallup
poll reported that only 13 percent of respondents held President Bush
responsible for the failed relief efforts in the first days after Hurricane
Katrina made landfall.66 This low number may suggest that overall
accountability is well below full accountability.67 Would accountability
add up to 100 percent if the survey had polled respondents on the
relative responsibility of each political actor involved?
I submit that shared political accountability reduces the total sum
of political accountability, i.e., creates “political accountability
deadweight losses.” When political responsibilities are shared, there is
uncertainty about which political actor is responsible. The uncertainty
is exacerbated when politicians point fingers. It is this uncertainty that
creates political accountability deadweight losses, on which
government actors can then capitalize.
I conducted a preliminary test of my argument in a survey.
Participants were asked to read a scenario that described how some
been here three days, yet there is no command and control. We can send massive amounts of
aid to tsunami victims, but we can’t bail out the city of New Orleans?’” (quoting Terry Ebbert,
head of the New Orleans emergency operations)).
63. See Michelle Millhollon, Blanco Says Feds Pledged Buses, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.),
Sept. 18, 2005, at A1. (“[W]ith the FEMA buses still not in sight, [Governor Kathleen] Blanco
called the White House . . . .”).
64. Much of this initial criticism was supported in the House report. See Spencer S. Hsu,
Katrina Report Spreads Blame, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006 at A1 (“A draft of the report . . .
includes 90 findings of failures at all levels of government . . . .”).
65. See, e.g., Hope Yen, Associated Press, Audits Show Millions in Katrina Aid Wasted,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 14, 2006, at A1 (“‘Once again, FEMA failed to adequately plan for
the very type of disaster that occurs virtually every year,’ said Susan Collins, R-Maine . . . .
Joseph Lieberman . . . said hurricane victims and taxpayers alike are being ‘ripped off.’ ‘It’s
unacceptable and ultimately infuriating. We need to do everything we can to insist that FEMA
and DHS prepare for the next disaster . . . .’”); News Release, U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina
(Sept.
27,
2005),
available
at
http://Katrina.house.gov/press_releases/
release_09_27_05.doc (calling Michael Brown “‘the government official most responsible for the
inadequate response,’” and urging the committee to “‘call him . . . without delay’” (quoting Rep.
Henry Waxman)).
66. Poll: Most Americans Believe New Orleans Will Never Recover, CNN.COM, Sept. 8,
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/07/katrina.poll (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
67. On the racial divide in the poll results, see generally Susan Page & Maria Puente, Views
of Whites, Blacks Differ Starkly on Disaster, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2005, at 1A, and Reactions
to Katrina Split on Racial Lines, CNN.COM, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ US/09/12/
katrina.race.poll (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
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cities in Belgium were struck by a flood. An external commission was
called to verify the damage, examine the cause of the flooding, and
determine which government actors were responsible. Participants
68
were randomly divided into two separate groups. Group A received
a scenario in which the external commission found that three
different government departments were responsible for the three
different causes of the flooding. Group B was told that only one
government department was responsible for all three causes of the
flooding. My hypothesis was that the total accountability assigned by
Group B would be higher than that assigned by Group A. In other
words, when only one government agency is responsible, the overall
accountability would be higher relative to scenarios in which three
agencies were responsible. Some amount of political accountability is
lost when responsibility is divided. The results confirm this
hypothesis. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
with the independent variable being the number of political actors
responsible (one versus three) and the dependent variable being the
sum of political responsibility assigned by the participants.69 This
analysis revealed a significant effect, F(1, 101) = 7.35, p < .01, showing
that in situations in which political responsibility was assigned
exclusively to one political actor, participants held this actor to a
higher level of accountability (mean = 65.00%, std. dev. = 14.74), than
when responsibilities were divided over three political actors (mean =
53.30%, std. dev. = 17.06).
The loss in the total sum of political accountability that occurs
when responsibility is shared may explain why politicians engaged in
a blame game following Katrina—the blame game exacerbates this

68. Participants were 103 male and female law students at Ghent University, between ages
nineteen and twenty-nine (mean = 21.26%, std. dev. = 1.59). Of course, this age range
undermines the external validity of this draft study. The age of the participants does not reflect
the mean voting age in the United States. Also, cross-cultural differences may appear when
running the study with American citizens rather than Belgian law students.
69. When three actors were responsible, total accountability was calculated as follows:

·

= mean percentage,

where Xi is the responsibility of government i for causing the flood, measured on a ten point
Likert scale. When only one actor was responsible, the ten point Likert scale was transformed
into percentages.

03__DEPOORTER.DOC

2006]

11/14/2006 8:31 AM

HORIZONTAL POLITICAL EXTERNALITIES

121

loss. Accordingly, finger-pointing is an attractive strategy for
individual politicians and politicians as a group because it reduces the
total political costs of government failings.
B. Cognitive Bias and the Demand for Disaster Management
Apart from the loss in total political accountability resulting from
shared responsibility among government actors, recent literature on
cognitive behavior suggests that voters’ cognitive bias reduces their
demand for disaster preparation and mitigation policies.
In the economic literature, voters are assumed to be myopic and
70
they tend to discount future value in favor of immediate benefits.
Researchers discovered that individuals have difficulty translating
remote risks into their decisions. As a result, the public perception of
remote risks often deviates substantially from what experts regard as
the statistically accurate risk.71 Furthermore, individuals rarely seek
out probability estimates, unless they have a clear reference point or
72
context in which to evaluate the likelihood of an event occurring.
Accordingly, “[p]eople may have difficulty gauging how concerned to
feel about a 1 in 100,000 probability of death without some
comparison points. Most people just do not know whether 1 in
100,000 is a large risk or a small risk.”73
Inhabitants of disaster-prone regions may discount remote risks
even more than inhabitants of areas where disasters are infrequent.
This stems from location-specific investments like relationships,
professional life, and material possessions. Contemplating the risk of
natural disaster is disconcerting. The theory of cognitive dissonance
teaches that people tend to reject information that creates internal

70. For an overview of the literature on time inconsistencies of voters, see generally Susan
C. Stokes, Public Opinion and Market Reforms: The Limits of Economic Voting, 29 COMP. POL.
STUD. 499 (1996).
71. On the conflation of the terms uncertainty and risk, see James E. Krier, Risk
Assessment, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note
48, at 347.
72. Amos Tversky et al., Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice, 95 PSYCHOL. REV.
371, 383 (1988); see also Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for
Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 247 (1996); Howard
Kunreuther et al., Making Low Probabilities Useful, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 103, 104
(2001).
73. HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, RISK ANALYSIS FOR
EXTREME EVENTS: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR REDUCING FUTURE LOSSES 30 (2004),
http://www.bfrl.nist.gov/oae/publications/gcrs/04871.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
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74
conflict in their lives. Therefore, citizens in disaster-prone areas may
discount the likelihood and potential impact of a hurricane or
earthquake. As a result, many individuals will not consider the
consequences of low probability events; instead, they treat such
events as having a zero chance of occurring. Consequently, they may
not demand loss mitigation strategies because they prefer not to think
about the consequences of a natural disaster in the region—the “it
will not happen to me” effect.75
Individuals may also be disinterested in ex ante disaster planning
because the benefits of such planning are reduced disproportionately
by the remote possibility of the benefits ever being realized. This had
led some to conclude that “low probabilities are inherently ineffective
76
in eliciting reactions.”
Although a particular disaster preparation policy might be
advisable from a cost-benefit perspective, voters who discount the
value of the benefits may lead politicians to forego such investments.
But the gap between the public’s perception of risk and the
statistically correct estimate of the risk may also point in the other
direction.77 That is, even though individuals often ignore risk and treat
low probability events as if the probability is zero,78 other times they

74. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & W.T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of
Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 309 (1982) (“[P]ersons who have made decisions
tend to discard information that would suggest such decisions are in error because the cognition
that the decision might be in error is in conflict with the cognition that ego is a smart person.”).
75. See George Lowenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 280 (2001)
(“[A]dolescents either do not consider some potentially harmful consequences of risky behavior
or underestimate the likelihood of these consequences happening to them.”).
76. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 73, at 29. Even when data is presented to
respondents, they elect not to use the information. See id. at 32 (“Uncertainty-avoiders who
have the tendency to avoid negative emotions need not buy more protection but may prefer to
avoid thinking about the need for protection and hence end up buying less.”); Wesley A. Magat
et al., Risk-Dollar Tradeoffs, Risk Perceptions, and Consumer Behavior, in LEARNING ABOUT
RISK 82 (W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat eds., 1987); Colin F. Camerer & Howard
Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 565, 566 (1989) (“[P]ublic perceptions are often unrealistic.”).
77. See Paul Slovic et al., Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective, in REGULATORY
POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 241, 262 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985) (“Why, for example, do
some communities react vigorously against the location of a liquid-natural-gas terminal in their
vicinity, despite the assurances of experts that it is safe?”).
78. See HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC
POLICY LESSONS 244 (1978) (“Our results strongly suggest that the consumer is the source of
market failure. It thus may be necessary to substitute other institutional mechanisms for the free
market if individuals are to be protected against the consequences of low probability high loss
events.”).
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79

will exaggerate the significance of low probability risks. Probability
perceptions are influenced by how easily events can be brought to an
individual’s attention—they rely on what is publicly available.80
Accordingly, the massive media attention accompanying national
disasters likely inflates individuals’ perceptions of risk. Thus,
disproportionate weight is given to salient, memorable, or vivid
81
evidence.
The probability estimate of the likelihood and impact of a
natural disaster is likely exaggerated after a hurricane or earthquake
occurs. As a result, voters may believe that a future disaster is more
82
probable than the statistically correct estimate warrants.
Although the public may not be concerned with preparation
before a disaster, it will pay close attention once a natural disaster
occurs. Politicians will then be subject to close scrutiny, especially if it
appears as if they did not anticipate the event adequately. Some
scholars maintain that the appropriate policy approach is for
politicians to ignore their constituents’ preferences when they are
based on statistically incorrect assessments of risks.83 Although the
public’s exaggerated response is anticipated in statutes insulating
84
governments from liability for flawed disaster management,

79. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 281 (1979) (“[V]ery low probabilities are generally
overweighted . . . .”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457 (1981) (“There are situations, however, in which the
outcomes of an act affect the balance in an account that was previously set up by a related
act.”).
80. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974) (“There are situations in which people assess the frequency of
a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be
brought to mind.”).
81. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 228 (1973) (“[D]ramatic and salient event[s] . . .
are likely to be more memorable and easier to recall . . . .”).
82. For instance, whenever a disaster occurs voters might switch from an ex ante
preference for policies conducted on (discounted) cost-benefit analysis in favor of an ex ante
preference in favor of policies that operate on the basis of the precautionary principle
(according to which action should be guided by worst case scenarios).
83. Other commentators argue that the public often knows best about risk. See generally
Clayton P. Gilette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027
(1990).
84. For an overview of statutory protection against governmental negligence liability in
disaster management, see generally Lerner, supra note 2, at 336–40. Such immunity usually
pertains to emergency planning, procurement of supplies for emergency preparedness, training
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politicians have no such immunity at the polls. A politician concerned
with getting reelected must contend with the political consequences
of voters who may overreact to disaster relief failures.
Although voters’ disinterest in disaster preparation may not
discipline politicians before a disaster, their exaggerated interest after
a disaster may cause politicians to adopt sound disaster management
policies as to future disasters. An empirical verification of this
proposition is beyond the scope of this Article. Note two caveats,
however. First, if politicians will be held responsible (i.e., get voted
out of office) for the suffering after a natural disaster, regardless of
how much precautionary planning they did,85 politicians may lack the
incentive to plan in the first place. Second, the public’s heightened
sensitivity to disaster preparedness after a disaster may be short-lived.
As a result, the political accountability costs of inadequate
preparation may be limited. In this regard, politicians may be able to
disregard voters’ heightened demand, unless a disaster precedes an
election by a short enough time span so that the politician will be held
fully accountable.
CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the underlying causes of the alleged
deficiency of national disaster planning. I have argued that such
failings can be explained by the shared political accountability in
national disaster management. Because the public views the
responsibility for national disasters as shared among the different
levels of government, the decisions of one political actor affect the
standing of other political actors. Using the concept of horizontal
political externalities among government actors, I argued that
investments in disaster preparation and ex post relief have different
effects on political accountability. Additional research on the effect of
political externalities will be needed to answer many of the questions
I have raised. In particular, the empirical validity of the role of
horizontal political externalities awaits testing. Surveys, such as the
tentative experimental design in Part II.A, could measure whether
action by one level of government has a positive (or negative) impact
on other levels of government that were not involved in the action.

of personnel, sheltering, evacuations, emergency transportation, supply of rescue and medical
services, emergency police and fire services, public utility service, etc. Id. at 336–37.
85. Id. at 333 (“As disaster is, by definition, a situation beyond control.”).
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Studies of this type could manipulate various variables that may
influence the public’s perception of shared accountability, e.g., the
allocation of responsibilities, types of media coverage, and fingerpointing among politicians. Many of these issues can also be
addressed by using existing field data on elections and approval
ratings. For example, correlation studies might trace the effects of
decisionmaking by one level of government on the election results of
other levels. Existing studies in political science, which evaluate
congressional election results in relation to presidential performance,
may be useful for this purpose.
Furthermore, I suggested that shared political responsibilities
may reduce overall political accountability. As a result of shared
political accountability various governmental bodies look to one
another and engage in a blame game that blurs the public perception
of political accountability. The tentative experiment in Part II.A
seemed to confirm this hypothesis, but, as with any pilot study, it
lacked the methodological rigor to provide robust support for the
suggested effect of shared accountability and political deadweight
losses. Also, the blame game might actually bring attention to
political failures that might not otherwise have received as much
attention. If so, the blame game is a dominant strategy for politicians
only when one politician defects, i.e., one politician starts pointing
fingers. Assuming that the blame game brings more attention than
would otherwise exist, it would be useful to explore the conditions
under which a politician would defect.
Although horizontal political externalities may only be a partial
explanation for disaster management failures, they provide an
interesting inroad for further research. In order to address the many
government failings exposed by Hurricane Katrina, an improved
understanding of the inner workings of disaster management policy
seems essential.

